Anwar Sadat’s Conflict Resolution Techniques for Business

Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt took an unprecedented step toward peace on November 19, 1977 by traveling to Jerusalem and meeting with Israel’s leaders; offering de facto recognition.

He wanted to reassure Israel of his sincere intentions and remove any psychological obstacles to peace, so made costly, irrevocable concessions that reduced their likelihood of being exploited or misinterpreted (Stein 1991). And this strategy worked.

1. Listening Skills

Sadat became Egypt’s president in 1970 to little fanfare; many in Egypt did not take him seriously as an authority figure; insulting caricatures of him appeared in newspapers, while rumors circulated about how his secretive, autocratic methods might bring down their nation. Yet in reality he transformed Egypt.

He made remarkable gains both domestically and abroad due to his unassuming manner, deep reading skills, and willingness to learn from others. When the world saw Sadat step from his airplane onto Israeli soil – in an act of extraordinary goodwill – for the first time, it became evident that Sadat had made possible moving beyond decades of distrust, animosity, and hatred towards peace – an objective still held dear by Egyptian people today.

On November 9, 1977, in the middle of his address to the People’s Assembly, Sadat made an unexpected announcement: He would travel directly to Jerusalem and seek direct talks with Israel. This dramatic step would allow Sadat to present Arab interests before Israel’s Knesset parliament – this idea had come from Vienna, Paris and London friends, proving his seriousness about resolving issues while creating momentum in his plans.

Camp David Accords brought longtime enemies Israel and Egypt closer than ever to reaching a lasting peace treaty, with eyewitness accounts such as former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Hermann Eilts’, Menachem Begin’s close aide Eliahu Ben-Eliasar’s and Abdel Monem Said’s recounting lessons learned during negotiations as recounted by Samuel Lewis and Peter Rodman both senior Department of State officials who participated. Samuel Lewis offers his insight as well. Samuel Lewis and Peter Rodman offer their perspectives as participants in negotiations as well. Samuel Lewis and Peter Rodman both offered their insights as participants during these talks as participants themselves. Samuel Lewis and Peter Rodman offer their insights as participants. Samuel Lewis and Peter Rodman from within both of these teams offer their perspectives as participants in talks offer their insights as participants – two senior Department officials from within departments involved provide their perspective as participants themselves.

2. Empathy

Sadat saw himself as a mediator and negotiator. Using empathy to understand people from various backgrounds – even his adversaries – Sadat worked towards building trust and encouraging peacemaking between Israel and Egypt, knowing it would benefit both nations equally.

Sadat understood that Egypt could only regain its lands from Israel by striking an agreement, which required changing their strategy completely and becoming a statesman instead of soldier. Sadat recognized this opportunity and took up this role himself.

Sadat graduated from the military academy and was sent to a remote outpost, where he formed relationships with Gamal Abdel Nasser and other officers of the revolution against British rule. They studied American battles like Gettysburg to gain knowledge on how to analyze and win wars.

Sadat took steps in the early 1970s to transform Egypt’s national security, taking on more responsibilities as a statesman rather than army general. He initiated talks with Israel and offered to come speak at their Knesset legislature – something no other Arab leader had done prior to this point.

The second section of this book explores Sadat’s domestic legacy with analyses from three professors with in-depth knowledge of Egypt and the Egyptian political system. The fourth and fifth sections focus on Egyptian-Israeli relations; chapter two addresses Sadat’s optimistic vision for both nations’ future, while chapter four details his challenges when trying to turn that vision into reality. Ambassador Samuel Lewis, former U.S. ambassador to Israel who participated in peace negotiations as an advisor, offers his insight on Sadat’s approach.

3. Negotiation Skills

Business world often reveres big-picture thinking while micromanagement can seem burdensome or pointless, yet when it comes to complex negotiations or conflict resolution, having the ability to zoom in on details can be invaluable.

Anwar Sadat’s negotiation skills brought Egypt tremendous advantages. He helped free it of Nasserism’s hold and place Egypt on the world stage; used his political acumen to forge relationships with Israel; secured tens of billions in American aid; modernized and improved Egypt’s army; enhanced infrastructure – even providing electricity access in rural communities across Egypt.

Sadat took immediate steps to sever himself from Nasser’s foreign policy, cutting Egypt off from Soviet influence and seeking support from the US in recovering territories lost to Israel. Furthermore, Sadat initiated an ambitious domestic reforms program intended to open Egypt up for foreign investment but which ended up creating high inflation levels which eventually caused food riots in January 1977.

At Camp David that September, Sadat and Begin met with Jimmy Carter to negotiate an Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and earn the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Their discussions, described minute by minute in Lawrence Wright’s book Thirteen Days in September, resulted in Sadat and Begin being awarded with a Nobel Peace Prize, leading to its conclusion and producing its terms. Soon afterwards Sadat led military efforts that defeated PLO in Lebanon which led to his assassination on 6 October 1981 by militants in Cairo for refusing to renounce its terms; he considered its contents an integral part of his legacy both as an Egyptian statesman and regional leader.

4. Analytical Skills

Sadat demonstrated his mastery of power dynamics by exploiting them to his advantage when dealing with both the United States and Israel. This skill was repeatedly showcased during negotiations.

He had an exceptional ability to anticipate others’ reactions and project his vision into the future, acquired through military training, his experiences during World War II as an anti-British activist, and his membership of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s revolutionary organization that overthrew Egypt’s pro-British monarchy in 1952.

Sadat realized when embarking on his policy of opening Egypt up to the West that domestic opponents would likely become oppositional and understood that foreign animus offered domestic opponents an opening to present themselves as patriotic alternatives to his leadership.

Sadat took steps to prevent this risk by initiating the October War (also known as Yom Kippur War) on 6 October 1973 with Syria, choosing this date because Israeli soldiers would likely be home during Ramadan with their families. He also gained support from oil-rich Arab states by threatening production cuts of 5 percent per month until Israel withdrew from Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights it had captured during Six Day War.

Sadat may have been inexperienced in politics, yet his grasp of power allowed him to create an environment conducive to his success. He approached both Americans and Israelis with the disarming (if counterintuitive) assumption that they shared deep interests, then articulated an approach towards meeting those interests. At Camp David he even sent a copy of his “fallback positions” over to President Truman as proof of reasonableness, thus enlisting their partnership in meeting his goals.

5. Conflict Resolution

Sadat understood this fact and sought to involve others – particularly Egypt’s military – in his vision of transformation. By surprising Henry Kissinger and Soviet representatives by unilaterally expelling them during the October War and choosing West instead of East Bloc allegiances later on, he made decisions that altered existing military cooperation agreements significantly.

Sadat understood the magnitude of his gestures required the support of thousands of people for them to have any lasting effect, so he never made decisions without thinking first and making sure each step brought him closer to achieving his ultimate objective – creating the impression of a small-town native making good in a big city.

Sadat may have left behind a legacy marred by domestic political struggles and unfulfilled promises, but his contributions were essential in setting Egypt up for prosperity. He assisted Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan on their respective paths towards peace; eliminating antagonisms between longstanding adversaries that autocracies use to justify their rule.

This book begins by exploring the internal Egyptian political system that shaped Sadat’s leadership style, drawing from three professors with intimate knowledge of Egypt. The second part addresses peacemaking and features analysis by Middle East specialist Shibley Telhami. Finally, in Part Three we see military changes caused by Sadat’s Jerusalem trip and comments by Maj. Gen (ret) Ahmed Fakhr and Ambassador Wat Cluverius before concluding with Parts Four and Five on both the fruits of and frustrations associated with peacemaking efforts.